“Chinese thinkers developed strategic thought that placed a premium on victory through psychological advantage and preached the avoidance of direct conflict.”
― Henry Kissinger, “On China”
In 2010, the United States and Israel attacked Iran — however, this was an atypical assault. This assault required no personnel, no equipment on location, no aircraft conducting overwatch, just some people hundreds if not thousands of miles away, potentially in Tel Aviv or Langley. What became known as Stuxnet caused Iran’s “centrifuges to fail while providing readings to their operators that they were running normally,” which degraded Iran’s nuclear weapons program to such an extent that an airstrike or special operations mission was not required (Council on Foreign Relations 2010). While the United States limits our cyber-assaults to military-grade targets, our enemies such as China have made it clear that they intend to “likely target transportation and logistics networks” since they are “heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology regarding warfare” which advocates for “deception, knowledge-style war, and seeking asymmetrical advantages over an adversary” (Caplan 2013, 98; Booz, Allen & Hamilton 2001, 12). While unconfirmed, China and its partner nation Russia have begun probing American infrastructure for weakness — such as by attempting to poison Oldsmar, Florida’s water supply with sodium hydroxide. The Law of Armed Conflict and Humanitarian Law states may only attack lawful targets, meaning civilians may not be attacked indiscriminately, even in cyber-warfare (Gisel and Olejnik 2018, 37). However, as can be seen by China, Russia, and Iran’s actions, in disregarding international law, international court rulings — such as The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, and their lack of adherence to fundamental human rights within their territorial boundaries shows that there is no intention to honor international law or norms. The Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law must be able to “speak softly” but simultaneously “carry a big stick” to ensure that norms are followed and adhered to.
China, Russia, Iran, and other similar states aim to degrade and destroy the American alliance system and “to weaken the two major Western alliances, NATO and the EU” (Karlsen 2019, 4–5). With nearly all nations engaging in precautionary behavior, no country wants to cross the proverbial Rubicon, which will draw them into a hot war. However, most nations are looking for the advantage that gives them an edge and allows them to weaken or gain an advantage over their enemy. Cyber-warfare continues to be a grey area in warfare where the question of “to what extent will a cyber warfare conflict encompass real-world assets and lead to full-scale war” remains (Colarik and Janczewski 2012, 39). As the capabilities of cyberwarfare move past merely hacking into a computer, gaining control, and stealing classified information but into the realm of human causalities and physical damage, cyberwarfare will be but the mere first salvo in warfare (Montgomery 2019, 502). Thus, nations are working on incorporating cyberwarfare into their national security doctrines. According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, the United States stands ready to “impose swift and costly consequences on foreign governments, criminals, and other actors who undertake significant malicious cyber activities” (Schadlow and Trump 2017, 13). As nations, especially first-world nations, prepare for this new phase in warfare, international organizations and laws must adapt to retain relevancy and efficacy.
The current push from international bodies is that “any additional rules developed” to confront this new form of sterile warfare “must comply with existing rules of [International Humanitarian Law]” (International Committee of the Red Cross 2021). However, the current body of rules that govern states’ actions, whether in pax tempus, jus ad bello, or even jus in bello, have been commandeered by the authoritarian states to implement their will. In order to protect the international order and democracies as a whole, International Humanitarian Law, Law of Armed Conflict, and other forms of international law must be reformed to be an equal and fair arbiter that protects its own moral and ethical foundations. In its current form, international law and organizations have been repurposed to “undermine the power of civil society, delegitimize human rights defenders, and advance [authoritarian] goals” while simultaneously shielding “itself and others from criticism and undermine the ability of the international human rights system to monitor and investigate violations” (Ginsburg 2020, 255). As an example, the United States of America, adhering to international law, states that
if the physical consequences of a cyber-attack constitute the kind of physical damage that would be caused by dropping a bomb or firing a missile, that cyber-attack would equally be subject to the same rules that apply to attacks using bombs or missiles (General Counsel of the Department of Defense 2016, 1014).
In contrast, China has no similar document or statement but instead embraces “a doctrine of a massive cyber first strike(s) on US military and civilian targets” (Matheson 2020, 11). To defend against such aggression, the Free World must be prepared to use the tools at their disposal to confront and halt the spread of authoritarianism.
To stymie the spread of these regimes and ideologies, the Free World must acknowledge that not all states are equal and work to delegitimize those states when they do not act in accordance with the will of the Free World. In order to work in concert to slow, halt, and push back the spread of authoritarianism, the Free World must work together. Focusing on cyberwarfare, authoritarian regimes that encroach on the sovereignty of other free states should incur a similar response to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meaning that an “attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all” (NATO 1949). For international organizations to continue to have weight and significance, they must condemn when the unfree world acts in opposition to international law, norms and harms the presuppositions that gird the global order. International organizations can no longer act as though all states “are equal members of the international community” and “have equal rights” since they do not engage in the prerequisite duties (Koskenniemi 2005, 478). The international community, especially the organizations created to gird this order, must be willing to firmly condemn the actions of the unfree world. From this understanding, depending on the severity of the assault, the Free World should work concurrently to engage in reprisal actions. Whether that be via cyber-warfare or other tools is dependent on the gravity of the assault.
From a diplomatic and economic standpoint, states that are currently member states, who use international bodies to tear at the social and civilizational fabric, should be excised from committees and positions where they can affect change (Albert 2020). Additionally, the People’s Republic of China should no longer be allowed to bully and malign sovereign states that hold and promote the free world’s values, such as the Republic of China (Taiwan). Instead, the Free World should work to promote and defend these nations in the face of severe adversity. In doing so, it would aid the Free World in technological and medical advancement — considering that Taiwan has shown openness and success working against diseases and it is also a global semi-conductor production hub.
If the Free World were to engage punitively with the People’s Republic of China, or other like states, for their incursions against the global community, whether that be in the South China Sea, the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, the Senkaku Islands, or in this case their infringements and assaults via cyberwarfare — China would be economically cut off from the developed world and forced to engage in trade with nations that do not have the surplus income to purchase ‘luxury’ goods. To promote this goal, packages such as the Trans-Pacific Pact should be reinvigorated and promoted with smaller countries, such as the Solomon Islands, which would prevent them from falling into China’s orbit (Will 2019). By doing this, China would experience an economic downturn in addition to its impending housing bubble collapse (Xie and Bird 2020). In addition to economic incentives, the Free World should work together to physically exhibit its displeasure by reengaging with historical eastern counterparts to reestablish military bases, from which they could work with the United States to conduct Freedom the Seas maneuvers and guarantee the sovereignty of smaller nations.
Unfortunately, in the current climate, these recommended actions would incur a statement similar to the one given in 2019 by the United Nations Secretary General where both the United States and China were treated as equally at fault and encouraged to work together (Worland 2020). However, looking at the actions of the People’s Republic of China — whether physically or otherwise, China is clearly seen as an aggressor who has no respect for the rule of law and thus is an unreliable and untrustworthy global partner. The international organizations built off the back of the American security guarantee should realize this and understand that China is working rapidly to further divide the globe into “two blocs.” The UN and the Law of Armed Conflict should stand on the side of the Free World, condone preventive action taken by the Free World, and be rewritten to prevent China, and other belligerent nations, from using the law to defend their actions and incur a cost for disregarding international law.
Works Cited:
Albert, Eleanor. “China Appointed to Influential UN Human Rights Council Panel.” The Diplomat. Trans-Asia Inc., April 8, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-appointed-to-influential-un-human-rights-council-panel/.
Booz Allen & Hamilton, and Steven A. Hildreth, Cyberwarfare § (2001).
Caplan, Nathalie. “Cyber War: The Challenge to National Security.” Global Security Studies 4, no. 1 (2013): 93–115.
Colarik, Andrew, and Lech Janczewski. “Establishing Cyber Warfare Doctrine.” Current and Emerging Trends in Cyber Operations 5, no. 1 (2012): 31–48. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137455550_3.
Council on Foreign Relations. “Connect the Dots on State-Sponsored Cyber Incidents — Stuxnet.” Cyber Operations Home. Council on Foreign Relations, July 2010. https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/stuxnet.
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Stephen W. Preston, Robert S. Taylor, and Jennifer M. O’Connor, Law of War Manual § (2016).
Ginsburg, Tom. “Authoritarian International Law?” American Journal of International Law 114, no. 2 (February 3, 2020): 221–60. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.3.
Gisel, Laurent, and Lukas Olejnik. “The Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations.” ICRC Expert Meeting. International Committee of the Red Cross, November 16, 2018. https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/97346/the-potential-human-cost-of-cyber-operations.pdf.
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Cyber Warfare: Does International Humanitarian Law Apply?” International Committee of the Red Cross, September 6, 2021. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/cyber-warfare-and-international-humanitarian-law.
Karlsen, Geir Hågen. “Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political Influence Activities in Europe.” Palgrave Communications 5, no. 1 (February 8, 2019): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8.
Koskenniemi, Martti. “Chapter 7: Variations of World Order: The Structure of International Legal Argument.” Essay. In From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 474–512. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Matheson, Will. “The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus in East Asia: Cyberwarfare’s Escalatory Potential in the US-China Relationship.” The Stanford Journal of Science, Technology, and Society 14, no. 1 (2020): 1–24.
Montgomery, Maxwell. “Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Under International Law: Virtual Attacks with Concrete Consequences.” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 28, no. 2 (2019): 499–521.
NATO. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” e-Library. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
Schadlow, Nadia, and Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America § (2017).
Will, George. “Time Is on Taiwan’s Side — But It Needs U.S. Support.” National Review. National Review, September 26, 2019. https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/09/taiwan-needs-us-support-against-china-dominance/.
Worland, Justin. “U.N. Head Says U.s.-China Tensions Risks Dividing World.” Time. Time, August 18, 2020. https://time.com/5879439/antonio-guterres-un-us-china/.
Xie, Stella Yifan, and Mike Bird. “The $52 Trillion Bubble: China Grapples with Epic Property Boom.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, July 17, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-property-real-estate-boom-covid-pandemic-bubble-11594908517.
Reflection Essay written for my graduate level program in National Security Studies at Park University
